This page was created by Collin Hardwick.
Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action Vol. 1
Discipline/Field: Philosophy, Sociology, Communications
Year: 1981
Main Arguments & Concepts
Habermas is working towards creating a theory of reason that works in the modern/postmodern era, after the notion that there is one objective subject position has been rejected. He points out that this theory is self-critical; it’s created based on the very notions that he’s calling into question: “the theory of communicative action is not a metatheory but the beginning of a social theory concerned to validate its own critical standards” (xxxix). He’s trying to create a rational argument about the nature of rational arguments.Communicative Action
Communicative action, for Habermas, must be about “reaching understanding” (286). It is explicitly not for “individual successes.” It sounds like this “reaching understanding” is a method of coming by a socially constituted rationality, though he is careful to point out that this is not “simple relativism” (336).
Communicative actions are then built on shared knowledge that is not considered arguable: “Literal meaning are, then, relative to a deep-seated, implicit knowledge about which we normally know nothing, because it is simply unproblematic and does not pass the threshold of communicative utterances that can be valid or invalid” (337).
This seems like a sharp departures from critical theorists and post-structuralists. Where is the power here? Can people “reach understanding,” free from contamination of individual interests? And what differentiates background knowledge from debatable knowledge?
Argumentation
“Types of Argumentation” figure on pg. 23 seems very relevant to rhetorical studies, particularly Aristotelian. Habermas highlights questions about Aristotle’s inductive & deductive logic. Habermas then offers three ways of looking at argumentation.
Argument has social outcomes: “Argumentation can be conceived as a reflective continuation, with different means, of action oriented to reaching understanding” (25). This is obviously very similar to definitions of rhetoric -- “inducing cooperation,” for example.
Argumentation is a process.
Argument is a knowledge-producing practice, similar to the scientific method. This sounds like the role of academic argument to me.
“Rhetoric is concerned with argumentation as a process, dialectic with the pragmatic procedures of argumentation, and logic with its products” (26).
Science vs. Philosophy
Habermas sees the two as distinct, needing to be used and analyzed separately. “Philosophy can no longer refer to the whole of the world, of nature, of history, of society, in the sense of a totalizing knowledge” (1). My sense here is that he is drawing a sharp line between the different methodologies, while also emancipating philosophy from the scientific method.
Quotes
“Cultural values do not count as universal; they are, as the name indicates, located within the horizon of the lifeworld of a specific group or culture. And values can be made plausible only in the context of a particular form of life. Thus the critique of value standards presupposes a shared pre understanding that is not at their disposal but constitutes and at the same time circumscribes the domain of the thematized validity claims” (42).Notes
On a goal oriented / problem solving conception of reason: “An assertion can be called rational only if the actor satisfies the conditions necessary to achieve the illocutionary goal of reaching an understanding about something in the world with at least one other participant in communication” (11).This seems very rhetorical, though perhaps more in the Communications sense of it. (It is -- this is his explanation tied to classical logos [10]).
Phenomenological take: “on this model, rational expressions have the character of meaningful actions, intelligible in their context, through which the actor relates to something in the objective world” (13).
Reason is related to normativity (16); “we can say that actions regulated by norms, expressive self-presentations ..” (17)
From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: “For Habermas, rationality consists not so much in the possession of particular knowledge, but rather in ‘how speaking and acting subjects acquire and use knowledge’ (TCA, 1: 11). Any such account is “pragmatic” because it shares a number of distinctive features with other views that see interpreters as competent and knowledgeable agents. Most importantly, a pragmatic approach develops an account of practical knowledge in the “performative attitude,” that is, from the point of view of a competent speaker.”
Related
Fairclough, Language & PowerFoucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge & Discourse on Language
Jameson, Postmodernism, Or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism
